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This Article provides a new perspective on the growth of secret law
in the United States. It is widely assumed that the U.S. government’s
exercise of national security powers suffers from excessive secrecy.
Although secrecy presents significant challenges, it does not alone
explain the lack of clarity surrounding the government’s legal
justifications for using military force, conducting surveillance, or
exercising other national security powers. The Article argues that
what is often labeled “secret law” may also be understood as a
consequence of how legal standards are used in this context. 
The Article draws on the larger rules versus standards literature
to help unpack the debate over secret law. This literature suggests
that standards should become clearer and more predictable over
time as a body of law accrues. The Article demonstrates, however,
that in the national security context, standards tend to expand, be-
coming more fluid and indeterminate. Though secrecy may impact
the inflationary trajectory of national security standards, it does not
alone explain it. The Article urges greater attention to how these
standards are formulated and applied to produce a body of law that
is more determinate and predictable and less prone to expansion. The
Article also cautions against viewing national security as a form of
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legal exceptionalism and instead notes its connections to adminis-
trative law more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
It is commonly—and correctly—assumed that U.S. national secu-
rity policy suffers from excessive secrecy. The focus is typically on
how the executive branch conceals the legal authority and legal
justifications for its actions, triggering complaints about secret law.1
The phenomenon of secret law has been associated with various
high-profile counterterrorism measures, from drone strikes to sur-
veillance programs. Commentators have described the threat that
secret law poses to the separation of powers, democratic account-
ability, and other tenets of the modern liberal state.2 But national
security secrecy also helps mask—and is sometimes confused with—
a lack of determinacy in the law itself.
In some instances, the debate over secret law has less to do with
transparency than with executive branch efforts to treat congressio-
nal delegations as invitations to develop broad and malleable stan-
dards that provide sufficient elasticity to respond to heterogeneous,
often rapidly developing events.3 A similar impulse helps explain at-
tempts by executive branch officials to strip rules of their ordinary
meaning, causing their sub rosa transformation into standards.4 In
both instances, focusing narrowly on secrecy can obscure underly-
ing tensions over how the law is given—or not given—content.
Although transparency remains important, this Article suggests
secrecy’s limits as an explanation for what are, in part, concerns
about the content of the underlying legal authority itself, including
the degree to which it constrains government officials and provides
notice to regulated actors. Secrecy may be more acute in matters
affecting national security. However, this Article cautions against
viewing national security as an isolated outpost of legal exception-
alism. By examining secret law against the larger rules versus
1. See infra Part I.
2. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Secrecy and Self-Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81,
82, 97 (2011/2012) (concluding that the Constitution provides only limited protection against
“undue government secrecy” and describing the incompatibility of secrecy, separation of
powers, and democratic accountability).
3. See infra Part III.A.1 (exploring the Bush Administration’s use of the Authorization
for Use of Military Force’s elastic “detention authority”).
4. See infra Part III.B.
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standards literature, the Article builds on an existing, but underde-
veloped, body of scholarship that situates national security within
the broader framework of administrative law.5
This Article thus seeks to reframe the debate about national
security secrecy as a debate, at least partly, about standards. It cau-
tions against focusing exclusively on transparency without regard
to how the underlying legal authority is designed and implemented.
The Article suggests that increasing avenues by which standards
can gain content through their application to specific cases, such as
through judicial review, can help counteract the indeterminacy that
is often associated with and sometimes mistaken for secret law.
Such review, moreover, can also mitigate the inflation of legal au-
thority through standards, although the degree to which courts will
impose constraints remains uncertain.6
A principal goal of the rule of law is to ensure obedience to rules
and avoid arbitrariness.7 As Lon Fuller explained, secret law under-
mines the internal morality of law itself, undercutting the obligation
to obey the law’s command.8 Secrecy can threaten the rule of law not
only by masking the legal authority by which power is exercised but
5. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883,
887-88 (2014) (examining the process of national security rule making); Christopher Slobogin,
Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO.
L.J. 1721, 1723-25, 1758-59 (2014) (applying administrative law principles to “panvasive
surveillance” that is not considered a search or seizure, such as NSA bulk metadata
collection); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2663-
64 (2005) (arguing for application of administrative law principles to the 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force and noting, in particular, that “the logic of Chevron applies to the
exercise of executive authority in the midst of war”); see also Eugene R. Fidell, Military
Commissions & Administrative Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 379, 383-84, 387-88 (2003) (describing
the value of applying an administrative law perspective to military commissions established
at Guantanamo to try unlawful combatants); David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the
Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2007) (examining how the civil adminis-
trative state has been mobilized in the war on terrorism).
6. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 887, 889 (2012) (explaining that, as an empirical matter, courts do not
necessarily lean to the libertarian left of the executive).
7. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 198
(6th ed. 1902) (explaining that the rule of law “means, in the first place, the absolute
supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power,
and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative ... on the part of government”).
8. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964) (“Certainly there can be no rational
ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that ... is kept
secret from him.”).
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also by concealing the fluidity and indeterminacy of that authority
itself. Although such indeterminacy can give public officials greater
latitude to respond to diverse and unforeseen challenges, it can also
enable authoritarian models of governance. Secrecy, moreover, can
undermine the principle of equality by enabling authorities to treat
the law’s subjects in a discriminate manner.9
Part I describes the growing concerns about secret law in the
United States and theories advanced to explain it. Part II surveys
the literature on rules and standards. It emphasizes the features of
standards that are particularly relevant to understanding their op-
eration in the national security context: their provision of broad ex
ante guidelines that enable government authorities to respond to
diverse situations; their lower cost to promulgate relative to rules;
and the expectation that they will be sharpened over time through
their application to individual cases by courts and agencies.
Part III applies these insights to national security secrecy. It
focuses on two commonly cited instances of secret law: (1) the use of
military detention and lethal force against terrorist groups under
the Authorization for Use of Military Force, and (2) new, more ex-
pansive government surveillance programs, such as those that rely
on bulk data collection. It explains how what is often diagnosed as
legal secrecy may also be understood as a function of how legal
standards are employed in these areas. Part IV then discusses sev-
eral implications of reframing the question of legal secrecy as one of
standards in the national security context. Although it recognizes
that public officials require some degree of both flexibility and se-
crecy, this Article suggests the need to strengthen the mechanisms
by which standards can be developed through their application to
individual cases.
I. THE GROWTH OF SECRET LAW
Commentators have highlighted the growth of legal secrecy in
recent years. Building on pioneering work by Kim Lane Scheppele,10
9. See Paul Gowder, The Rule of Law and Equality, 32 LAW & PHIL. 565, 565-66 (2013)
(explaining how the rule of law, which is required to treat individuals as equals, is achieved
only when states practice regularity, publicity, and generality).
10. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON
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David Pozen has applied the distinction between deep and shallow
secrecy to the control of national security information.11 Professor
Pozen explains that a secret is deep when a small group of similarly
situated individuals keeps the secret’s existence from the public.12
By contrast, “a secret is shallow if ordinary citizens understand they
are being denied relevant information and have some ability to esti-
mate its content.”13 The former includes not only the operational
details of a particular counterterrorism initiative but also the legal
authority to engage in it. Heidi Kitrosser has drawn a similar
distinction between what she terms “macro-transparency” and
“micro-secrecy.”14 Professor Kitrosser argues that a law’s “execution
must be traceable to publicly created and publicly known laws
[macro-transparency], even if those laws allow their execution to
occur in secret [micro-secrecy].”15 Secret law is a failure of macro-
transparency. Bruce Ackerman has similarly emphasized the dis-
tinction between secret and acknowledged programs.16 These
scholars all share the view that the greatest threat to democratic
accountability and separation of powers comes when a particular
program—and the legal rationale for it—remains hidden from the
public.17
Others have resisted distinctions between deep or macro-secrecy,
on the one hand, and shallow or micro-secrecy on the other, instead
emphasizing the connection between secrecy and illegality. Jenny-
Brooke Condon, for example, has cautioned against focusing too
heavily on secrecy per se.18 She argues that the focus should instead
LAW 21 (1988) (introducing the concept of the deep secret).
11. See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 275 (2010).
12. Id. at 274.
13. Id.
14. See Heidi Kitrosser, “Macro-Transparency” as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA
Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1165, 1174 (2007).
15. Id. at 1165. 
16. See Bruce Ackerman, The Secrets They Keep, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2005, 1:41 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/12/the_secrets_they_ keep.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9PG-GSW8]; see also Christopher Kutz, Secret Law and the Value of Pub-
licity, 22 RATIO JURIS. 197, 201 (2009) (distinguishing between “mere secrecy” and “meta-
secrecy”).
17. See, e.g., Kutz, supra note 16, at 200 (explaining that secret law “undermines
democratic accountability, raising the possibility that we do not know what our government
does in our name, and so cannot demand a change”).
18. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Illegal Secrets, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1099, 1104, 1106 (2014).
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be on illegal secrecy, observing that “‘shallow secrets’ can ... be no
less problematic than deep secrets when they insulate the govern-
ment’s illegal conduct from judicial and public review.”19 In a similar
vein, Jameel Jaffer has concentrated on the relationship between
secrecy and government accountability.20 He argues that “known
unknowns,” or information that is secret only formally and official-
ly, but which the public knows about, can “sever the connection
between transparency and accountability” for government miscon-
duct.21
U.S. counterterrorism policy after 9/11 provides fruitful ground
for the study of legal secrecy. Secrecy has permeated the detention
and interrogation of terrorism suspects, the use of lethal force
through drone strikes, and the creation of new surveillance pro-
grams relying on bulk data collection. Sometimes, the program itself
is secret (“deep” secrecy);22 other times, it is public, but its details
remain hidden (“shallow” secrecy).23 In both instances, the public
authority justification for the particular government activity may be
obscured or provided at a high level of generality through mere
references to a statute or to the President’s constitutional author-
ity as Commander in Chief.24 Such abstracted descriptions of the
government’s legal authority, without further elaboration, have
contributed to the perception of secret law.
As information becomes public—whether through leaks, litiga-
tion, public pressure, or a combination of factors—it stokes debate
over the proper limits on secrecy and the corresponding role of
transparency in a democratic society facing threats to its security.
Yet the secrecy-transparency discourse may also be understood as
a debate about the underlying form and content of the law itself.
That debate—which encompasses questions of how specific the law
should be and when (and how) its content should be articulated—
would benefit from increased attention to the rich literature on
19. Id. at 1105-06.
20. Jameel Jaffer, Known Unknowns, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (2013)
(describing how government secrecy, though illusory, may keep the government from having
to answer questions from the public or the courts).
21. Id. at 471. 
22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
24. See Pozen, supra note 11, at 297.
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rules and standards. The next Part surveys that literature and
explains how it can shed light on the phenomenon of secret law.
II. RULES, STANDARDS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
A substantial body of literature addresses the question of rules
versus standards as a legal form. This subject has been approached
from diverse perspectives, including political choice theory, judicial
behavior, and economic analysis,25 and it has provided insights into
various fields, including property,26 constitutional,27 and adminis-
trative law.28 This Article explains how the rules versus standards
discussion also offers valuable insights into the question of secret
law.
Rules and standards elude precise definition because the two
denote ends of a continuum rather than fixed and self-contained
points.29 However, the following example conveys the basic distinc-
tion.30 Assume a law prohibits driving too fast. A rule might prohibit
any person who travels on a residential street from going thirty
miles per hour, which the rule defines as speeding. The test for de-
termining whether a person has committed the offense of speeding
is straightforward: did the defendant drive a car on a residential
street, and if so, did her speed exceed the limit? By contrast, a
25. See, e.g., Adam H. Morse, Rules, Standards, and Fractured Courts, 35 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 559, 563 (2010); see also R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Admin-
istration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 235 n.275 (2002) (summarizing the
diversity of the rules versus standards literature).
26. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-
93 (1988) (explaining the divergent purposes of rules versus standards and arguing that,
rather than adopting one of these positions, property law is governed by both).
27. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Jus-
tices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992) (placing rules and standards
on a “continuum of discretion”).
28. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 66-67 (1983) (evaluating the precision of administrative rules by their transparency,
accessibility, and congruency).
29. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
561 & n.6 (1992); Morse, supra note 25, at 562; Sullivan, supra note 27, at 57 (explaining that
legal directives can be situated as rules or standards “to signify where they fall on the
continuum of discretion”).
30. This example was originally provided by Russell Korobkin. See Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 23
(2000). A version of the example also appears in Morse, supra note 25, at 562-63.
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standard might prohibit driving unreasonably fast on a residential
street, taking into account road conditions, traffic patterns, and
other factors relevant to the safety of residents. When applying this
standard, a judge must resolve factual questions and determine the
reasonableness of the driver’s speed under the circumstances.31
This example illustrates some basic attributes of rules and stan-
dards. Rules require more mechanical determinations (for example,
did the speed exceed thirty miles per hour?). As Kathleen Sullivan
has explained, a rule “binds a decisionmaker to respond in a deter-
minate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.”32 Because
they reduce a decision maker’s discretion, rules are relatively pre-
dictable.33 Their certainty, moreover, can help produce compliance
among the citizenry, which knows in advance the grounds for official
intervention.34 Rules, however, tend to be over- or underinclusive35:
a thirty mile-per-hour speed limit would exclude a careless driver
who was nevertheless traveling under the limit, but include a cau-
tious driver who was traveling modestly above the limit. Rules,
therefore, may in some cases appear arbitrary, irrational, and in
tension with the background principle or policy they seek to cap-
ture.36 
Conversely, standards give greater latitude to the decision mak-
er, who is empowered to apply the background principle or policy to
a particular set of facts.37 For example, a court would have to resolve
multiple issues to determine whether a person was speeding.38
Because standards permit greater case-by-case adjustment and
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, they are both
31. Morse, supra note 25, at 563; see also Korobkin, supra note 30, at 23.
32. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 58; see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-88 (1976) (“The extreme of formal
realizability [or ‘ruleness’] is a directive to an official that requires him to respond to the
presence together of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by
intervening in a determinate way.”).
33. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 1688 (describing “restraint of official arbitrariness and
certainty” as key features of rules).
34. Id. at 1688-89.
35. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 58.
36. Id. at 58-59; see also Kennedy, supra note 32, at 1689 (explaining how a rule’s rigidity
can involve “the sacrifice of precision in the achievement of the objectives lying behind the
rule[]”).
37. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 58.
38. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
2016] ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON SECRET LAW 2151
less predictable and less prone to over- and underinclusiveness.39
Standards are also relatively flexible and thus more capable of re-
sponding to changing conditions and behavior than rules, whose
specificity makes them vulnerable to becoming obsolete.40
Louis Kaplow has described the relative advantages of using stan-
dards or rules based on the nature of the regulated activity.41 The
choice between rules and standards, he explains, depends princi-
pally on the relative desirability of ex ante versus ex post creation
of the law.42 That, in turn, involves a determination of whether
information should be gathered and processed before or after indi-
viduals act.43 Professor Kaplow notes that “[r]ules are more costly
to promulgate than standards because rules involve advance deter-
minations of the law’s content, whereas standards are more costly
for legal advisors to predict or enforcement authorities to apply be-
cause they require later determinations of the law’s content.”44
Rules thus tend to be attractive to address frequently recurring fact
scenarios, as with many traffic laws, health and safety regulations,
and provisions of the federal income tax code.45 Standards, by
contrast, tend to be preferable when the law governs more heteroge-
neous behavior in which each type of relevant act may be rare, such
as the law of negligence, which applies to diverse and often complex
accident scenarios.46
The choice between rules and standards implicates the allocation
of responsibility among the respective branches of government:
legislators typically determine rules ex ante, whereas courts in-
terpret standards through ex post application.47 As standards are
enforced over time, they tend to become more rule-like through the
development of precedent.48 If enough decisions interpret a speeding
standard based on particular facts—such as road conditions and
traffic patterns—the standard begins to take on the specificity of a
39. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 58-59.
40. Id. at 66.
41. See Kaplow, supra note 29, at 584.
42. See id. at 562.
43. See id. at 585.
44. Id. at 562-63.
45. See id. at 563-64.
46. See id. at 563-64, 600.
47. Id. at 608.
48. Id. at 577.
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rule.49 The standard’s principles, as Judge Richard Posner explains,
become “particulariz[ed]” through application.50 As the standard be-
comes more rule-like, its predictability increases and its elasticity
decreases. Conversely, rules can become more standard-like over
time through the creation of exceptions and qualifications.51
The choice between rules and standards has normative implica-
tions. Scholars have explained how rules promote fairness by
protecting individuals against arbitrary and discriminatory gov-
ernment conduct, “requir[ing] decisionmakers to act consistently,
treating like cases alike.”52 Rules have been associated with the
protection of individual liberty for similar reasons: they bind the
exercise of authority to fixed, ex ante constraints.53 Yet, these same
attributes can make rules seem arbitrary and inequitable, suppress-
ing relevant similarities and differences through their formal
rigidity.54 
Standards, on the other hand, can promote fairness by reducing
arbitrariness and irrationality.55 They give decision makers the
latitude to treat alike cases that are formally distinct, but substan-
tively similar.56 By making determinations based on the specific
facts of an individual case, standards can help achieve—or avoid
frustrating—the legal directive’s underlying policy or purpose.
Standards, however, remain vulnerable to arbitrariness and un-
predictability for the same reason: they give greater discretion to
decision makers in determining the law’s content through their
application.57
In the administrative law context, Colin Diver has examined the
question of precision in rule making to develop a “standard for
standards.”58 The goal of achieving what he describes as optimal
49. See id.
50. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.4, at 424-25 (2d ed. 1977); see
also Rose, supra note 26, at 592-93 (describing the interaction of and tradeoffs between
standards and rules in the property law context).
51. See Sullivan, supra note 27, at 61.
52. Id. at 62.
53. See id. at 63-64.
54. See id. at 63.
55. Id. at 66.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 65-66.
58. Diver, supra note 28, at 66. In framing the question, Professor Diver paraphrases
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precision—thus avoiding the twin extremes of underprecision and
excessive regulatory rigidity—depends on the interplay of three
factors: transparency, accessibility, and congruency.59 Transpar-
ent rules “use words with well-defined and universally accepted
meanings within the relevant community”; accessible rules are
“applicable to concrete situations without excessive difficulty or
effort”; and congruent rules “produce[ ] the desired behavior”
through the “content of the message communicated.”60 Tradeoffs
typically occur among the three. For example, a transparent rule,
such as no person can drive without a high school diploma, “may
assure similar treatment of categorically similar cases, but it may
also fail to provide defensible applications.”61 Calibration is achieved
through a feedback loop when policymakers adjust to information
about social costs to reduce error and achieve the desired outcome.
Although they may be limited by distorting influences (incomplete
knowledge, imperfect vision, and selfish desires), policymakers can
achieve a degree of “bounded rationality”62 by moving towards an
“optimally precise formulation” for the particular regulatory con-
text.63 Adjudication by judges and agencies plays an important role
by providing a means by which standards and rules are developed
through application to concrete situations.
This literature on the relationship of standards and rules pro-
vides a useful perspective on legal secrecy in the context of national
security.64 National security law spans disparate fields, including
criminal law enforcement, noncriminal sanctions mechanisms,
noncustodial restrictions on liberty, intelligence gathering and other
forms of surveillance, and the law of armed conflict. Each, however,
Judge Skelly Wright, who described the need to develop standards for determining “when we
should require standards.” Id. at 66 & n.6 (quoting J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary
Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 587 (1972) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969))).
59. Id. at 67.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 72.
62. Id. at 98 (quoting James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engi-
neering of Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON. 587, 590-91 (1978)).
63. Id.
64. Cf. Zaring & Baylis, supra note 5, at 1367 (“In the scholarship on the administration
of the war on terror ... most observers have been thinking about divided government control
of the war-fighting executive rather than about the capabilities of the various independent
and executive branch agencies in helping to fight that war.”). 
2154 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2141
may be said to face a similar regulatory challenge as various areas
of administrative law: achieving the optimal degree of precision that
gives form to legal directives to achieve the desired goal without
unnecessarily or impermissibly infringing upon individual liberty,
equality, privacy, and other competing interests. Limits on or bar-
riers to adjudication can hinder an important mechanism by which
standards are distilled and rules are calibrated.
In the national security context, secrecy is commonly justified by
the need to avoid tipping off regulated actors, protect sources and
methods, and manage sensitive diplomatic or intelligence concerns.
However, secrecy in the design and application of counterterrorism
measures is in tension with the notion of law as public. Secrecy also
weakens due process principles, such as the requirement of notice,
because individuals remain unaware of the consequences of their
actions. Both sides of the secrecy debate tend to treat the law as
fixed and instead dispute whether (as well as when and to what
degree) it should be revealed to the public.65 
Yet there is more at work than an acoustic separation between
decision and conduct rules under Meir Dan-Cohen’s classic fram-
ing.66 Professor Dan-Cohen posits a distinction between decision
rules directed at officials and conduct rules directed at the general
public, which shape their perception and behavior.67 On various
national security issues, the legal framework itself resists partic-
ularization. It is not simply that government officials and the public
are hearing different rules because the law is saying different things
to different audiences. The law itself remains fluid, often deliber-
ately so. 
Viewed from this perspective, the growth of secret law in the
United States reflects more than a lack of transparency about de-
cision rules applied by officials to regulated actors. It also points to
ambiguities in the law that result partly from the combined effect
of two factors: (1) the expression of the law through standards de-
signed to give public officials greater flexibility, and (2) limitations
65. See supra Part I.
66. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
67. See id. at 630.
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on judicial review, which is the traditional means by which stan-
dards are liquidated into rules. 
III. SECRECY AND STANDARDS: THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND
SURVEILLANCE
Both the use of military force against al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups as well as government surveillance programs engaging in
bulk data collection have served as focal points for accusations
about secret law. Yet such accusations also reflect concerns about a
lack of particularity in the law itself that results from unliquidat-
ed standards. This Part describes how the debate about secrecy in
these areas may also be understood as one about the inflationary
potential and enabling effect of standards. It also describes how the
indeterminacy of the legal standard—and, thus, the perception of
secret law—tends to be greater where barriers to judicial review
are more pervasive. 
A. The Use of Military Force
Enacted days after the 9/11 attacks, the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorized the President “to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons” responsible for the attacks as well as those who
harbored attackers.68 The AUMF has served as the framework
statute for much of the war on terrorism, including the detention
and interrogation of and the use of lethal force against suspected
terrorists.69 Secrecy has surrounded much of the AUMF’s inter-
pretation and application, fueling a perception of secret law.70 This
68. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
69. For example, interpretation of the AUMF was central in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004) (plurality opinion), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the AUMF
permitted the detention of enemy combatants.
70. For one commentator’s characterization of the connection between secrecy and the
interpretation and application of the AUMF, see Gregory D. Johnsen, 60 Words and a War
Without End: The Untold Story of the Most Dangerous Sentence in U.S. History, BUZZFEED
(Jan. 16, 2014, 11:52 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/60-words-and-a-war-
without-end-the-untold-story-of-the-most [https://perma.cc/2ZTN-Y9P2]. See also Robert Be-
jesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking Al-Qaeda and Iran, 56 HOW. L.J. 1, 8-16 (2012);
Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 115, 124-25
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perception, however, may be due as much to the expression of the
AUMF through standards as to a lack of transparency in the law
itself. 
The exercise of war powers under the AUMF highlights two
salient features of standards: their ex post rather than ex ante de-
lineation of legal authority, and their potential flexibility, which
allows for their application to discrete—and often diverse—situa-
tions. The AUMF suggests how standards governing the exercise of
national security powers can resist liquidation into more rule-like
form and instead expand over time. The absence of transparency
surrounding the AUMF can thus obscure and, in some instances, be
mistaken for an underlying indeterminacy in the law itself. The
following discussion examines two related exercises of AUMF au-
thority—detention and targeting—from this perspective.
1. Detention
In approving the use of military force against persons and enti-
ties responsible for the 9/11 attacks and those who harbored them,
the AUMF effectively identified al Qaeda and the Taliban as its tar-
gets.71 Beyond that, the AUMF provided little guidance as to its
scope. The Bush Administration nevertheless relied on the AUMF
in conjunction with the President’s Article II powers as Command-
er in Chief to detain individuals in a wide variety of circumstances
and locations as an incident to the use of military force.72 It did not
initially elaborate on the legal basis for the detentions, nor did it
delineate the scope of the president’s detention authority with re-
spect to al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other organizations.73 The Bush
(2014).
71. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion) (“There can be no doubt that
individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an
organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those
attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF.”).
72. Id. at 516-17.
73. The Bush Administration also concealed the existence of executive authorization for
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to engage in detention operations. See S. SELECT COMM.
ON INTELLIGENCE, 113TH CONG., COMM. STUDY OF THE CIA’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION
PROGRAM, EXEC. SUMMARY 11 (Comm. Print 2014), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/
default/files/press/executive-summary_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVS7-69X2] (noting that the
President signed a covert action memo authorizing the CIA director to “undertake operations
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Administration, in short, originally kept hidden the most basic facts
surrounding detentions, including the identity of individuals in U.S.
custody, the methods of their interrogation, and, in the case of CIA-
run black sites, the existence of the detention facilities themselves.74
The Administration also refused to disclose its interpretation of the
President’s detention authority, which was set forth in secret memo-
randa by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).75
This lack of transparency over the AUMF’s meaning triggered
perceptions of a secret law being developed within the executive
branch. One might, however, also view the Bush Administration’s
initial claims of broad AUMF detention authority as evidence of the
enabling effect of standards.
This detention authority’s elasticity was perhaps best illustrated
by the shifting conceptions of “enemy combatant.”76 In some in-
stances, the Bush Administration opted for a narrow definition,77
describing AUMF detention as “classic wartime detention.”78 In
other instances, it advanced a definition that seemed to defy limits,
suggesting at one point that the President could detain “[a] little old
lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a chari-
ty that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to
finance al-Qaeda activities.”79 The Supreme Court provided only
designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or
death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities”). The full text of
that authorization—contained in a September 17, 2001, presidential covert action memoran-
dum of notification—still remains classified.
74. See JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 2, 58, 150 (2011).
75. See id. at 151.
76. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1732 (2009).
77. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Government has never provided
any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as [enemy combatants,
but] for purposes of this case [has defined an enemy combatant as] an individual who, it
alleges, was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in
Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ there.” (quoting
Brief for Respondents at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696))).
78. See Brief for Respondents at 20-21, 27, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696).
79. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (Nos.
CIV.A. 02-CV-0299CKK, CIV.A. 02-CV-0828CKK, CIV.A. 02-CV-1130CKK, CIV.A. 04-CV-
1135ESH, CIV.A. 04-CV-1136JDB, CIV.A. 04-CV-1137RMV, CIV.A. 04-CV-1144RWR, CIV.A.
04-CV-1164RBW, CIV.A. 04-CV-1194HHK, CIV.A. 04-CV-1227RWB, CIV.A. 04-CV-
1254HHK)).
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limited guidance, ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the AUMF
authorized holding enemy fighters for the duration of the armed
conflict as “a fundamental incident of waging war.”80 Hamdi did not,
however, address the scope of detention authority beyond those
captured fighting against U.S. or allied forces in a combat zone.
Over time, the AUMF’s detention standard gained greater clarity
through the process of adjudication. In early 2009, the Obama Ad-
ministration sought to articulate a single standard for presidential
detention authority in response to the federal courts’ exercise of
habeas corpus jurisdiction in the Guantanamo detainee litigation.
The Administration explained that the AUMF authorized the Pres-
ident to detain individuals who were “part of ” or who “substantially
supported” al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated enemy forces for the
duration of the armed conflict with those groups.81 The Administra-
tion did not define these terms with precision but instead sought
flexibility. It drew loosely on “[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war
rules” and resisted ex ante specificity.82 “It is neither possible nor
advisable,” the Justice Department explained, “to attempt to iden-
tify, in the abstract, the precise nature and degree of ‘substantial
support,’ or the precise characteristics of ‘associated forces,’ that are
or would be sufficient to bring persons and organizations within the
foregoing framework.”83 Justice further stated:
Evidence relevant to a determination that an individual joined
with or became part of al-Qaida or Taliban forces might range
from formal membership, such as through an oath of loyalty, to
more functional evidence, such as training with al-Qaida (as
reflected in some cases by staying at al-Qaida or Taliban safe-
houses that are regularly used to house militant recruits) or
taking positions with enemy forces.84
80. 542 U.S. at 519.
81. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1-2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109949 (D.D.C. 2005) (Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)).
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 6-7.
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The assumption was that this standard would be developed and
articulated through its application to individual cases.85 
Lower courts largely adopted the Obama Administration’s inter-
pretation of the President’s detention authority under the AUMF86
and applied a “totality of the evidence” test to determine whether a
particular prisoner fell within its ambit.87 Courts resisted any “set-
tled criteria” for determining who was “part of ” a covered enemy
force.88 Instead, they relied on a variety of factors, such as a person’s
travel patterns or associations.89 They then applied these factors in
individual cases, further clarifying the definition. In 2012, Congress
adopted the Obama Administration’s interpretation of the Presi-
dent’s detention authority.90 
Secrecy remains an issue that limits public knowledge about the
facts that underlie the government’s asserted basis for the Guan-
tanamo detentions, as well as the conduct of the litigation itself,
including attorneys’ ability to share relevant information with their
clients. Yet the Guantanamo habeas cases illustrate how secrecy
can obscure related but ultimately distinct concerns triggered by
the elasticity of standards and how those standards can become—or
fail to become—more particularized through adjudication.
The features of AUMF detention authority that have resisted
judicial examination, such as the duration of detention, tend to
remain more ambiguous. The international law of armed conflict
(LOAC) requires the prompt repatriation of prisoners upon the
cessation of hostilities,91 even when no peace treaty has been
85. See id. at 2.
86. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding the
President’s authority to detain under the AUMF individuals that were “part of ” or who
“materially supported” al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces (quoting Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948a(1)(A)(i), 120 Stat. 2600, 2601)).
87. See, e.g., Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Naji al Warafi v.
Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37-39 (D.D.C. 2010)). See generally BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., THE
EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/5/guantanamo-wittes/05_
guantanamo_wittes.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDG2-76DF].
88. Khan, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (citing Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009)).
89. See Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 403-07 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
90. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
91. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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signed.92 Relying on this background LOAC norm, the United States
maintains that it can hold prisoners for the duration of the armed
conflict with al Qaeda and other AUMF-covered forces.93 The 2012
National Defense Authorization Act validated this interpretation,
clarifying that the AUMF authorizes continued detention “under the
law of war ... until the end of the hostilities.”94 President Obama, to
be sure, has described the need to bring the war with al Qaeda to a
close and repeal the AUMF,95 and former senior administration
officials have similarly cautioned against a “forever war.”96 Yet of-
ficials have never specified criteria for determining the end of
hostilities against al Qaeda and associated forces.97 For years, courts
accepted the LOAC principle that detainees can be held under the
AUMF for the duration of the conflict, but declined to provide speci-
fic criteria for determining when hostilities have ceased.98 Recently,
a district court ruled that detention authority continued as long as
fighting is ongoing, thus rejecting one detainee’s claim that he
92. See Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention
Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 1180 (2011) (noting that Article 118 of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War “sought specifically to eliminate
pretexts to delay repatriation used in earlier conflicts, such as the absence of a formal peace
treaty or the ‘non-termination of the armed conflict by or against a co-belligerent’” (quoting
ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 217 (2008))); David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire
Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 801, 919 (1996)
(“State practice established by cease-fire agreements supports a broad norm of repatriation.”).
93. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. 143, 189 (2014).
94. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1021(c)(1).
95. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May
23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-university [https://perma.cc/7WAT-HVXA] (“[T]his war, like all wars, must end.”).
96. Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of Int’l Law, Yale Law Sch., How to End the
Forever War?, Remarks at the Oxford Union (May 7, 2013), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/world/2013/KOHSPEECH.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSE7-E6LL].
97. See Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., The Conflict Against Al
Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will it End?, Remarks at the Oxford Union 8-9 (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/211954.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE7V-Y8C4] (not-
ing that there would come “a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of
al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured” that the organization with which the
United States is at war “has been effectively destroyed,” but declining to provide specifics on
when that tipping point might come).
98. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion) (explaining
that the continued detention of an enemy combatant was authorized because “[a]ctive combat
operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan,” but declining to
provide more specific criteria for determining the cessation of hostilities). 
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should be released because of statements by the President that the
U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan was over.99 Apart from such
limited guidance, the law governing the end of hostilities for pur-
poses of AUMF detentions has not been secret so much as defined
at a high level of abstraction.
Such generality is attractive to executive branch officials for
several reasons. It not only helps them respond quickly to new
threats but also provides flexibility to address enduring and seem-
ingly intractable problems, such as the Guantanamo detentions. For
example, defining the temporal bounds of the conflict at a high level
of generality helps enable the administration to continue holding
detainees whom it is unwilling to transfer to other countries,
whether because of restrictions imposed by Congress or security
considerations.100 Loosely defining the conflict itself, meanwhile,
leaves open the option to engage in detention operations in emerg-
ing military theaters, such as Syria, should that be deemed
desirable, without seeking new legal authority from Congress.101
Detentions under the AUMF have unquestionably suffered from
gaps in transparency. But continued uncertainty surrounding
various aspects of the President’s detention authority is less a
function of secret law than the product of standards that have
resisted particularization. Secrecy, to be sure, helps perpetuate legal
99. See Al Warafi v. Obama, No. 09-2368, 2015 WL 4600420, at *7 (D.D.C. July 30, 2015)
(rejecting the petitioner’s claim that he should be released because the President had declared
an end to the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan).
100. See generally David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and Political
Clash over Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 179, 206 (2012)
(discussing obstacles to transferring detainees from Guantanamo). The lack of clarity
surrounding the AUMF’s duration has prompted proposals to enact a sunset provision. See,
e.g., Ryan Goodman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Approves ISIL AUMF and Sunset
of 2001 AUMF, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 11, 2014, 2:18 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/18319/
forever-war-watch-senate-foreign-relations-committee-approves-isil-aumf-sunset-sept-2001-
aumf/ [https://perma.cc/WV3H-SJ3Q] (describing Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approval of draft authorization for use of force against ISIL that would sunset the 2001
AUMF within three years).
101. The Obama Administration, for example, has reportedly detained Umm Sayyaf, the
wife of a senior ISIL leader in Syria. Her husband, Abu Sayyaf, was killed after engaging
U.S. forces. However, the United States has avoided specifying how the AUMF authorizes her
detention, leaving the legal theory to educated speculation. See Nathalie Weizmann &
Rebecca Ingber, Whatever Happened to Umm Sayyaf?, LAWFARE (June 11, 2015, 8:10 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/whatever-happened-umm-sayyaf [https://perma.cc/8B9A-C33Z]
(describing the possible legal basis for detention under the AUMF).
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indeterminacy by concealing important facts and providing a ra-
tionale for denying judicial review, thus foreclosing an avenue by
which standards can be particularized. But secrecy alone does not
explain the underlying fluidity in the law itself.
2. Targeting and the Use of Force
The AUMF has also provided the statutory foundation for lethal
drone strikes against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and, most recently, Syria.102
Drone strikes have been shrouded by even greater secrecy than
detentions, and have generated accusations that the United States
is waging a shadow war across the globe.103 They have also been
criticized for misidentifying targets and harming innocent civil-
ians.104 In one high-profile example, the United States acknowledged
that a drone strike in Pakistan mistakenly killed two western hos-
tages held by al Qaeda.105 Human rights groups have continued to
document civilian casualties notwithstanding that the administra-
tion introduced reforms designed to minimize such casualties.106
Critical gaps remain in the factual record surrounding drone
strikes, such as the identity of intended and actual targets; the
number, dates, and status of people killed; and the location of each
102. See Leila Nadya Sadal, America’s Drone Wars, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 215,
224-31 (2012).
103. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 195 (2010); MARK MAZZETTI, THE WAY OF THE KNIFE: THE CIA, A SECRET ARMY,
AND A WAR AT THE ENDS OF THE EARTH 218 (2013); JEREMY SCAHILL, DIRTY WARS: THE WORLD
IS A BATTLEFIELD 358 (2013); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/the-questions-brennan-cant-
dodge.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6MNS-3A2W].
104. See PETER BERGEN & KATHERINE TIEDEMANN, NEW AM. FOUND., THE YEAR OF THE
DRONE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN, 2004-2010, at 1 (2010), http://vcnv.
org/files/ NAF_YearOfTheDrone.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AZ-627E]; Sadal, supra note 102, at
228.
105. See Peter Baker, Obama Apologizes After Drone Kills American and Italian Held By
Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaeda-
hostages-were-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-white-house-says.html [https://perma.cc/N8MM-
WD5W].
106. See AMRIT SINGH, OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, DEATH BY DRONE: CIVILIAN HARM
CAUSED BY TARGETED KILLINGS IN YEMEN 1, 6 (2015), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/death-drones-report-eng-20150413.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QB8-TFL6].
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drone strike as well as the particular agency involved.107 The broad
legal justification for using lethal force, by contrast, has become
clearer over time. The continuing gap between a general targeting
standard on the one hand, and the standard’s application to parti-
cular situations on the other, yields an indeterminacy in the law
governing the use of force. The Obama Administration has been
able to apply this standard with greater flexibility than the stan-
dard’s purported stringency suggests. Although often cited as an
example of legal secrecy, the law governing the use of force may be
better described as a case of legal fluidity.
U.S. officials initially refused to provide information about drone
strikes, including the legal basis for conducting them.108 But mount-
ing criticism of their use, particularly outside Afghanistan, increas-
ed pressure on officials to respond.109 In May 2010, Harold H. Koh,
then Legal Adviser to the State Department, provided the first
public explanation of the legal basis for drone strikes at the annual
meeting of the American Society of International Law.110 Professor
Koh defended the use of drone strikes in the armed conflict against
al Qaeda and associated forces, explaining that they were author-
ized domestically under the AUMF and complied with all applicable
international law.111 Although Professor Koh did not engage in de-
tailed legal analysis, he identified the two bases under international
law for drone strikes: the LOAC and the law of self-defense.112 In
public speeches over the next two years, other senior U.S. officials
107. See Jameel Jaffer, The Erosion of a Secret, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 12, 2014, 11:56 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/14908/erosion-secret/ [https://perma.cc/DW5H-TFDF]; see also
Koh, supra note 96, at 14-15 (urging the Obama administration to be more transparent re-
garding the factual record surrounding drone strikes including the Administration’s “method
of counting civilian casualties” and the threat posed by particular targets).
108. Former CIA Director Leon Panetta provided an early, if indirect, acknowledgment of
remote drone strikes in Pakistan in May 2009, noting that they were “the only game in town
in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership.” U.S. Airstrikes in
Pakistan Called ‘Very Effective’, CNN (May 18, 2009, 6:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/
POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/ [https://perma.cc/VCS8-XBSJ].
109. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/the-predator-war [https://perma.cc/3384-AT2N].
110. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and
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elaborated on the legal grounds for drone strikes.113 Although the
speeches did not provide a granular discussion of legal authorities,
they did offer a road map to the legal architecture of the Obama
Administration’s targeted killing program.114 
The speeches maintained that: (1) the United States remains
engaged in a transnational, noninternational armed conflict (NIAC)
with al Qaeda and associated enemy forces; (2) the AUMF autho-
rizes the President to use military force against those enemy forces;
(3) the President has additional authority as Commander in Chief
under Article II of the Constitution to protect the nation from an
imminent threat of attack; (4) the President’s authority to use lethal
force is not limited to “hot,” or active, battlefields; (5) the President
may use such force against nonstate actors in another country if
that country either consents to its use or is unwilling or unable to
contain the threat those actors pose; and (6) all uses of force must
conform to the LOAC, including the principles of necessity, distinc-
tion, and proportionality.115 
Administration officials stressed that this legal framework pro-
vided the outer limit for the use of force and suggested that the
United States often used force in a more restrictive manner as a
113. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterror-
ism, Remarks at Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening Our
Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Brennan,
Strengthening Our Security], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/
remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an
[https://perma.cc/35B7-AUNW]; John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Sec. & Counterterrorism, Prepared Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012)
[hereinafter Brennan, Ethics and Efficacy], http://www.cfr.org/counter terrorism/brennans-
speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100 [https://perma.cc/NGT8-Q5WV]; Eric Holder,
Attorney Gen., Prepared Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-northwestern-
university-school-law [https://perma.cc/D585-MRQS]; Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel,
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law School: National Security Law, Lawyers and
Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.lawfareblog.com/jeh-
johnson-speech-yale-law-school [https://perma.cc/TM43-Y9F6].
114. See Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decision-
making, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 398-401 (2013) (describing how speechmaking by Obama
administration officials not only provided to the public the preexisting rationale for executive
programs but also helped drive the executive “to crystallize and finally bind itself to a po-
sition”).
115. See Holder, supra note 113 (“Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in
Afghanistan.”).
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matter of policy.116 Thus, before launching a drone strike, U.S. of-
ficials asked whether the target posed “a significant threat to U.S.
interests.”117 Officials, in turn, defined a significant threat as a per-
son who; (1) is an operational leader of al Qaeda or an associated
force; (2) is himself an operative in the midst of training for or plan-
ning to carry out attacks against the United States or its interests;
or (3) possesses unique operational skills that are being leveraged
in a planned attack.118 Officials noted that the United States would
use lethal force only if capturing the individual was not feasible.119
In response to media reports that the United States had placed on
a “kill list” Anwar al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen suspected of being a
senior operational leader for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) in Yemen, high-level officials described the additional legal
justifications for using force against a U.S. citizen. Then Attorney
General Eric Holder, for example, identified the following criteria:
(1) the U.S. citizen must “pose an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States;” (2) capture must not be feasible; (3) and
the operation must be conducted in a manner consistent with the
LOAC.120 Holder further emphasized that no lethal strike against a
U.S. citizen could go forward without a “thorough and careful re-
view” by U.S. officials.121
Further details were provided in an unsigned and undated Jus-
tice Department “White Paper,” obtained by NBC News and made
public in February 2013.122 The White Paper described the U.S. gov-
ernment’s legal position on the use of force against a U.S. citizen
who “is an operational leader” of al Qaeda “located outside the Unit-
ed States” and who is “continually planning attacks against U.S.




120. Holder, supra note 113.
121. Id.
122. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE [DOJ], LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST
A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE
1 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/
020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DAN-4R49]; Michael Isikoff, Justice Depart-
ment Memo Reveals Legal Case for Strikes on Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2013, 5:57 PM),
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-
reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans [https://perma.cc/MPF6-GGHZ].
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persons and interests.”123 It summarized a more complete legal
analysis contained in a July 16, 2010 OLC Memo,124 which was sub-
sequently made public in June 2014 as a result of FOIA litigation
brought by the ACLU and New York Times.125 The memo, which was
heavily redacted, was written in response to the possible targeting
of al-Aulaqi. The United States subsequently killed al-Aulaqi in a
drone strike in Yemen in September 2011, along with another U.S.
citizen, Samir Khan.126
Both the White Paper and the July 16, 2010, OLC Memo discus-
sed the legality of targeted killing. The White Paper, for example,
addressed the concept of “imminence,” explaining that the United
States “does not require ... clear evidence that a specific attack on
U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate fu-
ture.”127 Such a narrow conception of imminence, the White Paper
explained, would force the “United States to refrain from action un-
til preparations for an attack [were] concluded” and, therefore,
“would not allow the United States sufficient time to defend it-
self.”128 Instead, at least with respect to al Qaeda leaders who are
continually planning attacks, the United States could strike with-
in any “limited window of opportunity” that presented itself.129 The
White Paper and OLC Memo also defended the legality of strikes
against American citizens abroad, notwithstanding the U.S. Con-
stitution,130 the War Crimes Act,131 and a federal criminal statute
123. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 6.
124. See Memorandum on the Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution
to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi from David J. Barron,
Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ, for the Attorney Gen. (July 16,
2010), [hereinafter July 16, 2010 OLC Memo] https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
2014-06-23_barron-memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6M8-QKLM].
125. See N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 752 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2014); Charlie Savage, Court
Releases Large Parts of Memo Approving Killing of American in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (June 23,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/us-officials-sued-over-citizens-
killed-in-yemen.html [https://perma.cc/R9CN-RYQW].
126. See Charlie Savage, Relatives Sue Officials Over U.S. Citizens Killed by Drone Strikes
in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/
us-officials-sued-over-citizens-killed-in-yemen.html [https://perma.cc/X7EG-ST76]. A third
U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, was inadvertently
killed in a U.S. drone strike the following month. See id.
127. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 7.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 5 (examining the legality of targeted killing under the Fourth and Fifth
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prohibiting the U.S. government from killing U.S. nationals
abroad.132 The White Paper and OLC Memo’s explanations of the
legal basis for strikes tracked those provided in speeches by senior
administration officials and helped flesh out the legal justification
for the Administration’s targeted killing program.
In May 2013, President Obama delivered an address regarding
drone strikes at the National Defense University.133 In connection
with the speech, Obama issued a Presidential Policy Guidance
(PPG) outlining standards and procedures for lethal strikes that
either were already in place or that would be implemented over
time.134 The PPG described drone strikes as a last resort, stating
that lethal force would be used “only to prevent or stop attacks
against U.S. persons, and even then, only when capture is not fea-
sible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to address the
threat effectively.”135 The PPG stated that lethal force would be
used outside areas of active hostilities under specified criteria.136 It
further noted that targeting decisions were made “at the most senior
levels of the U.S. government” and that “an additional legal analy-
sis” is conducted if the target is a U.S. citizen.137
The Obama Administration has thus far disclosed only one of the
legal memoranda it has relied on to kill suspected terrorists; others
reportedly exist.138 But the Administration has nevertheless provid-
ed a reasonably clear outline of its legal authority to engage in
Amendments); July 16, 2010 OLC Memo, supra note 124, at 38 (same).
131. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 15-16; July 16, 2010 OLC Memo, supra note
124, at 37.
132. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 10 (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 1119(b)); July 16,
2010 OLC Memo, supra note 124, at 12 (same).
133. See Obama, supra note 95.
134. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and
Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States




136. Id. (listing criteria). 
137. Id.
138. Eleven memos reportedly exist. See Andrew Rosenthal, Telling Secrets, N.Y. TIMES:
TAKING NOTE (Mar. 3, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/telling-
secrets/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HF2Y-6FDW]. At least one of those memos is another OLC
memo referenced in the July 16, 2010 Memo discussed above. See July 16, 2010 OLC Memo,
supra note 124, at 40.
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drone strikes. Indeed, the crux of the plaintiffs’ argument in FOIA
litigation seeking disclosure of documents discussing the legal ba-
sis for the targeted killing of al-Aulaqi—which the Second Circuit
adopted in ordering disclosure of the July 16, 2010, OLC Memo—
was that the Administration’s legal justifications were not secret but
had already been made public through various speeches and state-
ments by administration officials.139 
Two factors help explain the continuing perception of secret law
despite the disclosure of the government’s asserted authority to
conduct drone strikes. First, the Administration continues to conceal
critical facts surrounding drone strikes even after they have occur-
red. Second, and relatedly, this authority still takes the form of a
general standard that has resisted liquidation through its applica-
tion to specific cases, partly because of barriers to judicial review.
Take, for example, the use of “imminence.” The current standard
defines imminence only in the negative: it tells us more about what
imminence is not—a particular attack in the immediate future—
than what imminence is.140 The “no other reasonable alternatives”
standard evinces a similar level of generality, borne of a desire for
flexibility.141 The current standard describes capture as the pre-
ferred approach but provides no meaningful guidance as to when it
would permit targeting as an alternative to capture. 
Most significantly, a broadly articulated targeting standard has
helped perpetuate ambiguity regarding precisely where, with whom,
and on what theory the United States is engaged in armed conflict.
This uncertainty has facilitated the use of force under the AUMF
against AQAP in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
in Somalia, and most recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Le-
vant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria.142 The list of forces covered by the
139. See N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 752 F.3d 123, 141 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that prior disclo-
sures and acknowledgments through various speeches by administration officials and the DOJ
White Paper waived any claim the government had to preventing release of the legal analysis
contained in the OLC opinion at issue).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
141. See supra text accompanying note 135.
142. See John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar
al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 190 (2011) (describing the government’s po-
sition), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/159-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-175.pdf [https://
perma.cc/634G-9CQ8]; Charlie Savage, Obama Adviser Discusses Using Military on Terrorists,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/us/john-o-brennan-on-use-of-
military-force-against-al-qaeda.html [https://perma.cc/8HKN-QBPJ] (discussing the Obama
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AUMF has expanded significantly over time.143 The United States,
moreover, has often resisted specifying whether a particular group,
such as AQAP, falls within the AUMF because it is part of al Qaeda
or because it is a successor force.144 The standard governing the use
of force has thus demonstrated considerable elasticity, such as when
the United States claimed it could use force against ISIL as a suc-
cessor force to al Qaeda despite the various differences and tensions
between the two groups.145 The United States has also avoided pro-
viding a precise definition of associated forces, relying instead on
generalized criteria, such as whether the new group is a “cobellig-
erent” of an AUMF-covered force (al Qaeda or the Taliban).146
Although the Department of Defense recently provided a list of as-
sociated forces against whom the United States is presently using
force,147 that list does not include other groups the United States be-
lieves the AUMF covers but against whom the United States has not
yet chosen to use force. The list, moreover, may expand to include
additional groups in the future. 
In these respects, the AUMF more closely resembles an expansive
delegation of authority to confront emerging threats by extremist
groups than an authorization to use force against a specific enemy.
As one commentator put it, an authorization malleable enough to
engage in future combat against an amorphous collection of al
Administration’s perspective on the AUMF’s application to AQAP and Al-Shabaab). The
Obama Administration also relied on a separate 2002 authorization to use force against ISIL
in Iraq. See Karen DeYoung & Ed O’Keefe, Obama to Seek Congressional Authorization to
Fight Islamic State, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/obama-to-seek-congressional-authorization-to-fight-islamic-state/2015/
02/10/c150d2d2-b160-11e4-854b-a38d13486ba1_story.html [https://perma.cc/J5DF-JSGK].
143. See John Reed, Rethinking How We Wage the Forever War, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 20,
2015, 1:03 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/22220/rethinking-wage-war/ [https://perma.cc/
JN22-QWYS].
144. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, The Obama Administration and the Prospects for a Demo-
cratic Presidency in a Post-9/11 World, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 27, 36 (2011/2012) (quoting the
government’s position regarding AQAP in Yemen).
145. See Deborah Pearlstein, On the Theory that ISIL Is Al Qaeda, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 11,
2014, 4:59 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/11/theory-isil-al-qaeda/ [https://perma.cc/FVR6-
3QLM].
146. Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 691-92
(2014). 
147. See Marty Lederman, Highlights from DOD General Counsel Stephen Preston’s ASIL
Speech, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 10, 2015, 5:45 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/21928/preston-
asil-speech/ [https://perma.cc/Z735-FXMF].
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Qaeda-affiliated persons risks opening the door to an “endless game
of global whack-a-mole.”148 This malleability helps illuminate the
phenomenon of secret law. Rather than waging war across the globe
based on a body of secret law,149 the United States may thus better
be understood as selectively using force under standards that pro-
vide a basic template of legal authority but that resist the type of
concretization and specification that ordinarily occurs when stan-
dards are liquidated through their application to particular cases.
This approach has given the United States greater latitude to
address evolving security threats and helped it navigate changes in
the nature of armed conflict that have altered traditional under-
standings of terms such as “battlefield” and “combatant.”150 But it
has also loosened constraints on the use of force.
The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by one state against
another,151 except when authorized by the Security Council to main-
tain or restore peace or security,152 or in self-defense in response to
an armed attack.153 Maintaining that the armed conflict against al
Qaeda and associated groups is not territorially restricted has alle-
viated the need for the United States to engage in a self-defense
analysis under the U.N. Charter each time it uses force by placing
the use of force within the framework of armed conflict.154 An elastic
concept of imminence155 offers additional latitude to respond with
force to perceived threats before those threats have ripened. The use
148. Reed, supra note 143.
149. See THE STIMSON CTR., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON US
DRONE POLICY 9 (2d ed. 2015), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/recommendations_
and_report_ of_the_task_force_on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ74-
L69A] (describing the perception of war waged based on secret law).
150. Id. at 12.
151. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state).
152. Id. arts. 39, 41-42.
153. Id. art. 51 (authorizing the use of force in self-defense against an armed attack).
Whether, and to what extent, the U.N. Charter authorizes the use force in anticipation of an
armed attack remains unsettled. See Jane E. Stromseth, New Paradigms for the Jus Ad
Bellum?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 561, 564-65 (2006). The use of force in self-defense, in-
cluding against an anticipated armed attack, is also recognized under customary international
law. See James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula
in Contemprary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 429, 431, 466-69 (2006).
154. Brennan, Strengthening Our Security, supra note 113. 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
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of signature strikes provides further flexibility, allowing the United
States to launch drone strikes based on suspicious patterns of ac-
tivity even if it does not know the identities of those who would be
killed.156
To help alleviate concerns that the current framework has weak-
ened restraints on the use of force, Obama’s PPG offers more rule-
like formulations. The PPG, for example, states that there must be
“[n]ear certainty that the terrorist target is present” and “[n]ear
certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed” when le-
thal force is used “outside areas of active hostilities.”157 In fact,
neither “certainty” is required under the LOAC. The PPG’s in-
sistence on “near certainty” instead reflects a concern about the
implications—political, strategic, and ethical—of waging a bound-
aryless conflict against nonstate actors.158 When applied, the PPG
could provide constraints on the executive and limit operational
flexibility. But it is not binding and can be dispensed with, as it
reportedly has been in the recent campaign against ISIL.159
Additionally, although the PPG offers a more rigorous interpre-
tation of jus in bello principles that regulate the use of force within
armed conflict, such as distinction and proportionality, it does not
affect the jus ad bellum determination of whether force may be
156. See Peter Margulies, Constraining Targeting in Noninternational Armed Conflicts:
Safe Conduct for Combatants Conducting Informal Dispute Resolution, 46 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1041, 1074-75 (2013).
157. PPG, supra note 134 (footnote omitted).
158. Naz Modirzadeh, A Reply to Marty Lederman, LAWFARE (Oct. 3, 2014, 7:34 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/reply-marty-lederman [https://perma.cc/MF2X-SBR5] (“The so-
phistication of the PPG is that by referencing so many international law-sounding principles,
it gives the appearance of a unilateral decision by the [United States government] to bind
itself to a higher standard than it must, when it chooses, as a matter of policy.”). Professor
Modirzadeh argues that the United States has cherry-picked concepts from the (formerly)
distinct legal frameworks of the LOAC and international human rights law to create a new
type of “folk international law,” which creates amorphous legal standards and avoids
accountability. See Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the
Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law
to War Governance, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 225, 228-29 (2014).
159. See Michael Isikoff, White House Exempts Syria Airstrikes from Tight Standards on
Civilian Deaths, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 30, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/white-house-
exempts-syria-airstrikes-from-tight-standards-on-civilian-deaths-183724795.html [https://
perma.cc/9N8S-B5AD] (noting the Administration’s explanation that the “near certainty”
standard was meant to apply only when the United States takes direct action “outside areas
of active hostilities,” which “simply does not fit what we are seeing on the ground in Iraq and
Syria right now”).
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used in the first instance.160 President Obama has instead described
limiting the use of force in aspirational terms, explaining his wish
to decrease reliance on drone strikes,161 avoid a perpetual war
against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups,162 and increase reliance
on soft power mechanisms to address terrorist threats.163
Criticisms about secret law made by human rights groups and
other nongovernment organizations in the context of drone strikes
reflect as much a concern with the current framework’s fluidity as
with its lack of transparency.164 Law is not simply hidden; it is inde-
terminate. The main transparency problem remains factual, with
gaps in information surrounding details such as the number of
strikes, the circumstances under which they occur, and a description
of those killed, including the collateral damage. A recent report, for
example, provides evidence that U.S. drone strikes have continued
to kill numerous civilians in Yemen despite President Obama’s
imposition of the “near certainty” requirement—evidence that has
been hidden from the public by the secrecy that surrounds such
strikes.165 This informational gap does not merely make it more
difficult to determine whether the law is being followed. It also
raises questions about what the law actually is, because when a
legal directive takes the form of a standard, it typically depends on
its application to specific situations for elaboration.166 
That process of elaboration often occurs through adjudication.167
But in the case of targeting, justiciability doctrines have thus far
barred review of targeted killings, whether ex ante through the
160. See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
161. See Obama, supra note 95 (“We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology
takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a
perpetual war—through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments—will prove self-
defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways.”).
162. See id. (“The Afghan war is coming to an end. Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former
self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of
thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States.”).
163. See id.
164. See, e.g., Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] et al. to President Barack
Obama (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_ material/4-11-13_US_
LetterToPresidentObamaOnTargetedKillings.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5LX-6K49] (calling on
the government to be more transparent “by demonstrating the legal bases for targeted killing
policies and practices”).
165. SINGH, supra note 106, at 40.
166. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
167. Kaplow, supra note 29, at 585.
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provision of injunctive or declaratory relief or ex post through a
damages action. When, for example, Anwar al-Aulaqi’s father
brought suit to challenge his son’s placement on a kill list, the court
dismissed the suit because it raised a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion.168 The district court thus declined to address the legality of the
standard under which the United States can select individuals for
targeted killing or its application to al-Aulaqi. By dismissing the
suit, the court avoided clarifying whether a particular group (in this
case, AQAP) fell within the AUMF, the required nexus of a targeted
individual to that force, what particular activities make an indi-
vidual an imminent threat such that they may be lawfully killed,
and what alternatives to lethal force the United States would first
need to employ.169 Another suit was brought after the United States
killed not only Anwar al-Aulaqi but also his son, Abdulrahman al-
Aulaqi, whose death was the unintended result of a separate drone
strike.170 That ex post damages suit was also dismissed on justi-
ciability grounds.171 The court concluded that judicial review “would
impermissibly draw [it] ... into the heart of executive and military
planning and deliberation” and require it to address “fundamental
questions regarding the conduct of armed conflict,” which, it said,
should be left to the political branches.172 
The absence of an adjudicatory process to address targeted kill-
ings helps prevent any means by which legal norms, defined at a
high level of generality, gain content through their application to
individual cases. To borrow from Raymond Carver,173 what we talk
about when we talk about secret law is, at least partly, standards
that resist particularization.
B. Surveillance and Bulk Data Collection
Secrecy has pervaded the design and implementation of bulk
data collection and other surveillance programs. Those programs
have together led to the collection and storage of the content and
168. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C. 2010).
169. See id.
170. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 58-59 (D.D.C. 2014).
171. See id. at 80.
172. Id. at 79.
173. See RAYMOND CARVER, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT LOVE 137 (1981).
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metadata of e-mails and telephone calls of millions of individuals.174
After 9/11, President Bush authorized the NSA to collect telephony
and Internet metadata and telephone and Internet content without
review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) pur-
suant to the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP), also known by
its code name, STELLARWIND.175 Both the contours and legal jus-
tifications for activities conducted under the PSP have shifted over
time.176 After the New York Times revealed in December 2005 that
the National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting telephone con-
tent between the United States and overseas—one component of the
PSP—the Bush Administration provided its first legal explanation
of the program to the public.177 Initially, the Administration ground-
ed the PSP on the President’s Article II Commander in Chief
authority, the War Powers Resolution, and the AUMF, which the
Administration said overrode FISA’s prohibition on warrantless
electronic surveillance.178 Continuing concerns about the PSP’s legal
foundations prompted the Administration to bring it within the
FISA umbrella. In July 2004, the FISC approved the Administra-
tion’s request to bring the Internet metadata program under FISA’s
pen register and trap and trace provisions,179 and in May 2006, it
174. See James Bamford, They Know Much More Than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug.
15, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/nsa-they-know-much-more-
you-think/ [https://perma.cc/ZVD8-FP3G] (describing the collection of metadata of telephone
communications); Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Re-
vealing Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/investigations/us-surveillance-architecture-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-
phone-metadata/2013/06/15/e9bf004a-d511-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/LB3H-R2TR] (describing the collection of the content of Internet and
telephone communications).
175. See Ryan Lizza, State of Deception, NEW YORKER (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/16/state-of-deception [https://perma.cc/KT6H-AD8A].
176. See Laura K. Donohue, FISA Reform, 10 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 599, 600
(2014).
177. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-
without-courts.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/45F8-5273].
178. DOJ, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB178/surv39.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAY3-EV5B].
179. Opinion and Order, No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 2-3 (FISA Ct. July 14, 2004), http://
www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VDN-JSYH].
Although those provisions refer to “a pen register or trap and trace device,” Judge Colleen
Kollar-Kotelly, the then-presiding judge of the FISC, nevertheless sanctioned the bulk
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approved the Administration’s request to bring the bulk collection
of telephony metadata within FISA’s business records provision.180
The other PSP collection programs—those aimed at international
telephone and Internet content—were subsequently shifted to FISA
through the passage of the Protect America Act (PAA) in 2007 and
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), which made the tempo-
rary changes of PAA permanent. 
Even when the executive publicly invoked statutory authority for
the PSP—whether under the AUMF, section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, section 702 of the FAA, or other provisions of FISA—
it resisted providing the underlying legal rationale contained in
still-secret OLC memoranda and FISC opinions.181 In addition to
approving and reauthorizing bulk data collection programs, the
FISC opinions found in several instances that the programs exceed-
ed existing authority, violated prior court orders, and impermissibly
captured the domestic communications of tens of thousands of
Americans.182 The public were not the only ones kept in the dark.
Congress was informed selectively and incompletely about these
surveillance programs and the legal basis for them.183 While its
opinions had almost always remained secret before,184 the FISC had
acquisition of metadata—allowing the real time and ongoing collection of the metadata of
potentially tens of millions of customers—under a single FISC order covering multiple
devices. Id. See generally Orin Kerr, Problems with the FISC’s Newly-Declassified Opinion on
Bulk Collection of Internet Metadata, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2013, 2:35 AM), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/problems-fiscs-newly-declassified-opinion-bulk-collection-internet-metadata
[https://perma.cc/4N5U-P4NS].
180. See In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring




182. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, at 1-2 (FISA Ct.
Jan. 28, 2009), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_
redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YM5-GQ6L] (order regarding notice of compliance
incident dated January 15, 2009); Memorandum Opinion, No. [Redacted], at 2 (FISA Ct. Oct.
3, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinion-and%20Order-
20140716.pdf [https://perma.cc/C98E-MCXV] (order finding components of NSA’s bulk
collection under section 702 “deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds”). 
183. See Letter from Sens. Ron Wyden & Mark Udall to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. (Sept.
21, 2011), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=a3670ed3-9f65-4740-b72e-061c7de83f75
&download=1 [https://perma.cc/J46H-VCDV] (“[T]he decision to classify the government’s in-
terpretations of the law itself makes informed debate on [domestic surveillance] impossible.”).
184. See Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret
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typically engaged in the routine application of law to facts—deter-
mining whether a warrant should issue in a particular case—rather
than engaging in judicial lawmaking by interpreting the scope and
legality of new surveillance programs.185
The U.S. government’s bulk data collection programs have served
as a focal point for concerns about secret law. Prior to the revela-
tions by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, some lawmakers
had correctly predicted that Americans would be “stunned” when
they learned about secret government interpretations of statutes,
such as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.186 Since the revela-
tions, advocacy groups have attacked “a hidden body of law that
defines the government’s power to collect information about millions
of Americans” and pressed for increased disclosure and transpar-
ency.187
Surveillance depends on a degree of secrecy.188 The government
cannot conduct effective surveillance of a target that knows it is
being watched. Secrecy is thus necessarily more pervasive in sur-
veillance than in kinetic activities, such as detention and targeting,
that have a visible impact and, in turn, increase pressure on public
officials to justify their actions. Yet as with detention and targeting,
secrecy alone does not capture the controversy over hidden interpre-
tations of the government’s legal authority. That controversy also
stems from the use of elastic standards and a resistance to rules
that might more sharply constrain government conduct.
Prior to FISA, foreign intelligence collection was largely unreg-
ulated by statute and unsupervised by courts. Congress enacted
FISA in 1978 following the Church Committee’s report documenting
Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 481, 506 (2014)
(“[D]uring the first 24 years of its existence, from its inception until 2002, the FISC only ever
publicly released one single opinion (which did not relate to electronic surveillance).”).
185. See id. at 505-06.
186. 157 CONG. REC. S3386 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statement of Sen. Wyden); 157 CONG.
REC. S3389 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statement of Sen. Udall).
187. Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, ACLU v. FBI, 59 F.
Supp. 3d 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 11 Civ. 7562 (WHP)); see also id. at 13 (describing how
“pivotal interpretations of our public laws” are hidden from the public view).
188. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 632 (2010)
(noting that “[a]t first blush, transparency seems like an odd fit with an intelligence
community that inevitably carries out much of its work in secret,” but also suggesting areas
in which greater transparency is warranted).
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decades of warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens, including for
political purposes,189 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Keith
suggesting that a special, less restrictive framework for foreign
intelligence surveillance might be constitutionally permissible.190
FISA, as Laura Donohue has observed, “became the instrument
designed to limit the NSA’s collection of information on U.S.
citizens.”191 It subjected all domestic foreign intelligence surveil-
lance, and some surveillance abroad, to a specific warrant procedure
modeled on, but ultimately distinct from, the warrant procedure for
criminal cases. Warrants were issued by the newly created FISC,
which meets in secret and imposes a less onerous showing than for
ordinary criminal wiretaps.192 FISA also required minimization
procedures that are “reasonably designed in light of the purpose and
technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition
and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly avail-
able information concerning unconsenting United States persons
consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce,
and disseminate foreign intelligence information.”193 Congress sub-
sequently amended FISA to authorize other forms of intelligence
gathering.194 In general, however, FISA retained its basic structure,
demanding a particularized showing in relation to the target prior
to the collection of information, an individualized court order, and
heightened protections for U.S. persons.195 
The bulk collection of domestic telephony metadata, which
circumvented this basic framework, is a commonly cited example of
secret lawmaking. After 9/11, the Bush Administration began
189. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. 2, at 36-40 (2D SESS. 1976),
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_II.pdf [https://perma.cc/BFT6-
8QKA]. See generally FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 50-54 (2007).
190. See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972); see also
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (describing Keith).
191. Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 773 (2014).
192. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2012).
193. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1); see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2002).
194. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829 (physical searches); id. §§ 1841-1846 (2012) (pen registers
and trap and trace devices).
195. Donohue, supra note 191, at 797.
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collecting domestic telephone call and Internet records without judi-
cial authority.196 In May 2006, the FISC approved the bulk collection
of records under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act; over the next
seven years, fifteen different FISC judges issued thirty-five orders
reauthorizing the collection.197 The FISC orders did not become
public until June 2013, when The Guardian first published doc-
uments obtained by Snowden.198
The bulk telephony metadata program, however, demonstrates
more than legal secrecy; it also highlights the inflationary potential
of standards in the national security context. The precursor of the
section 215 program was added to FISA in 1988.199 It originally
allowed the government to obtain an order compelling the produc-
tion of business records in foreign intelligence or international ter-
rorism investigations from common carriers, public accommodation
facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.200 To obtain
an order authorizing the production of records under this provision,
the government had to provide the FISC with “specific and artic-
ulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the
records pertain[ed was] a foreign power or an agent of a foreign pow-
er.”201 After 9/11, Congress modified this provision through section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent legislation. Section
215 provided for the production of “any tangible things (including
books, records, papers, documents, and other items).”202 It further
required the government to provide the FISC with “a statement of
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation
(other than a threat assessment) ... to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a United States person or to protect
196. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 177.
197. Erin E. Connare, Note, ACLU v. Clapper: The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age,
63 BUFF. L. REV. 395, 398 (2015).
198. See Verizon Forced to Hand Over Telephone Data—Full Court Ruling, GUARDIAN (June
5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-
court-order [https://perma.cc/756M-9HLS].
199. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862.
200. Id. § 1862.
201. Id.
202. The only limitation on the types of records that may be obtained with a section 215
order is that the types must be obtainable with a grand jury subpoena. Id. § 1861(c)(2)(D).
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against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activi-
ties.”203
Section 215 thus broadened the type of records that may be ob-
tained, replaced the requirement of “specific articulable facts” with
a more generalized concept of “relevance,” and eliminated the re-
quirement that the target be a “foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power” and instead required only that the items be obtained
in the course of an investigation to obtain “foreign intelligence
information” to “protect against international terrorism or clan-
destine intelligence activities.”204 Although Congress still insisted on
a connection between the records sought and the target of the inves-
tigation,205 these changes reduced the degree of specificity required
of the government to obtain information. The USA PATRIOT Act
made changes to other FISA provisions that similarly enhanced the
government’s ability to obtain and search electronic files.206 
Section 215’s treatment of “relevance” illustrates how standards
can reduce constraints on the government’s ability to conduct sur-
veillance. Under the section 215 program, bulk telephony metadata
collection is considered relevant to counterterrorism investigations
because it provides the necessary “historical repository of metadata”
that may later be accessed through a more particularized query.207
Without that historical repository, government officials have ex-
plained, it might not be feasible to identify and examine chains of
communications between a terrorist suspect and his own contacts
203. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
204. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). The USA PATRIOT Act eliminated the “specific and ar-
ticulable facts” requirement, but in 2005, Congress reintroduced a requirement that the
government provide a statement of facts establishing “reasonable ground to believe that the
tangible things” to be obtained were “relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a
threat assessment).” USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, § 106(b), 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006).
205. Donohue, supra note 191, at 799; see also id. at 804 (discussing that Congress designed
FISA to be used in “specific cases of foreign intelligence gathering” as a means of protecting
U.S. citizens’ privacy).
206. See USA PATRIOT Act § 216 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)) (increasing the avail-
ability of pen register devices to include the interception of Internet metadata); id. § 214
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)) (reducing the standard for obtaining Internet metadata so
that the FBI need only certify to the FISC that the information likely to be obtained is
“relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities”).
207. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 50, ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015)
(No. 14-42). 
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across different time periods and communications networks.208 As
one district judge found in upholding the program, bulk telephony
metadata collection is relevant to counterterrorism investigations
because “it allows the querying technique to be comprehensive” and
enables the government to “draw connections it might otherwise
never be able to find.”209 But as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Over-
sight Board (PCLOB) cautioned: “[I]f the government develops an
effective means of searching through everything in order to find
something, then everything becomes relevant to its investigations,”
and relevance “becomes limited only by the government’s technologi-
cal capacity to ingest information.”210 
In response to the controversy over Snowden’s revelations about
the section 215 program, President Obama announced several re-
forms, including submitting requests to query the database to the
FISC, which would have to find reasonable articulable suspicion
that the number to be queried was connected to a suspected ter-
rorist (rather than allowing the executive to decide that question on
its own), and limiting queries to within two “hops” of the original
contact number queried (as opposed to the three hops previously
permitted).211 In May 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit declared in ACLU v. Clapper that the bulk metadata col-
lection program exceeded the authority granted by Congress.212 The
court thus rejected the government’s expansive interpretation of
section 215’s relevance standard, upon which it relied to create a
historical repository of information unconnected to any specific
208. See id.
209. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d, 785 F.3d 787 (2d
Cir. 2015). Orin Kerr has called this new approach “a collect-it-all-and-query-with-suspicion
model.” Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV.
1513, 1528 (2014).
210. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD. [PCLOB], REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 62 (2014), https://www.eff.
org/files/2014/01/23/final_report_1-23-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/73LM-2XZH]. The PCLOB is
an independent agency within the executive branch.
211. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17,
2014 11:15 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president
review-signals-intellig [https://perma.cc/D629-V4W2]; Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End
to N.S.A.’s Bulk Data Collection N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-data.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5XMN-JR54].
212. See 785 F.3d 787, 812 (2d Cir. 2015).
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investigation. On June 2, 2015, just one day after section 215 had
expired under a sunset provision in the statute, Congress enacted
the USA FREEDOM Act, ending the bulk domestic metadata col-
lection program.213 Among other changes, the Act prohibits the
government from collecting telephony metadata, which must instead
remain with private companies, and requires the government to
obtain a warrant from the FISC to access such metadata.214 Both the
Second Circuit’s ruling in Clapper and the enactment of the USA
FREEDOM Act thus pushed back against one component of ex-
panded surveillance powers that had developed in secret through
the articulation of broad standards. 
FISA section 702 has also relaxed constraints on government sur-
veillance. After 9/11, President Bush authorized the NSA to conduct
warrantless wiretapping of telephone and e-mail communications
in which “one party to a communication was located outside the
United States and a participant in ‘the call was reasonably believed
to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
organization.’”215 Passage of the FAA in 2008 brought this sur-
veillance activity under FISA.216 The FAA dispensed with several
traditional FISA requirements. Under the FAA, the government no
longer has to show probable cause that the target of the electronic
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; it also
no longer has to specify the nature and location of each of the par-
ticular facilities or places where that surveillance occurs. Instead,
the FAA permits the targeting of persons “reasonably believed to be
outside the United States” when a “significant purpose” of the
surveillance is to acquire “foreign intelligence information.”217
Additionally, the statute diminishes the FISC’s authority to de-
mand, and eliminates its authority to supervise, privacy-intrusion
minimization procedures that are instance-specific.218 These changes
213. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective
Discipline Over Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268,
282. The Act provides for a six-month transition period, after which bulk collection is
prohibited. Id.
214. See id.
215. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143-44 (2013) (quoting Appendix to
Petition for Certiorari at 403a, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11-1025)).
216. Id. at 1144.
217. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a), 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
218. Id. § 1881a(e).
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deprive targeting of its ordinary meaning: in place of a rule re-
quiring specific information about an individual “target,” the FAA
permits programmatic surveillance by substituting a broad stan-
dard of “foreign intelligence information” and severing any nexus to
particular individuals.219 While the FAA nominally limits the tar-
gets of surveillance to foreign nationals, it enables the surveillance
of U.S. citizens whose communications are collected “incidentally”
in the process,220 a result FISA was originally intended to prevent.221
Word play has facilitated the sub rosa transformation of intel-
ligence rules into permissive standards. As Jennifer Granick has
explained, the NSA has repeatedly “warp[ed] language in order to
make rules mean something very different from what ordinary
people would take them to mean.”222 For example, when Senator
Ron Wyden (D-OR) asked Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper whether the NSA collects any information on millions or
hundreds of millions of Americans,223 Clapper responded “[n]o ...
[n]ot wittingly.”224 In fact, the NSA was collecting such information,
219. Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v).
220. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_
story.html [https://perma.cc/H3XK-9N3N] (describing secret rules instructing NSA analysts
to enter search terms “that are designed to produce at least 51 percent confidence in a target’s
‘foreignness’”); Faiza Patel, Extending Privacy Protections to Foreigners Will Benefit Ameri-
cans, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 6, 2014, 3:04 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/17170/extending-
privacy-protections-foreigners-benefit-americans/ [https://perma.cc/28VK-7SMN] (describing
the risks of incidental collection of U.S. citizen communications).
221. Donohue, supra note 191, at 771-73 (describing the incidental collection of information
about U.S. persons prior to FISA).
222. See Jennifer Granick, The Surveillance State’s Legalism Isn’t About Morals, It’s About
Manipulating the Rules, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.justsecurity.
org/17393/ics-legalism-morals-manipulating-rules/ [https://perma.cc/GD48-XML9]. Granick
notes that “[a] Defense Intelligence Agency ‘intelligence law handbook’ explains that a [De-
fense Department] document regulating NSA conduct has special definitions of commonly
used words, so that analysts should ‘adjust their vocabulary’ lest they be led astray by relying
on commonly understood definitions.” Id. But see Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and
the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 112, 117-18
(2015) (describing the rise of “intelligence legalism,” which prefers rules and rights over
policy-based solutions that could more effectively protect civil liberties).
223. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 66 (2013) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden,
Member, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence).
224. Id. (testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence).
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as Clapper knew at the time.225 However, Clapper later defended his
answer, which he called the “most truthful, or least most untruth-
ful” statement he could make, by distinguishing between “collect”
and “gather.”226 
Surveillance standards, moreover, have resisted narrowing de-
spite evidence of noncompliance. In 2009, FISC Judge Reggie
Walton expressed concern about the government’s use of identifiers
to query the database of telephony metadata collected under section
215 that did not meet the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” stan-
dard prescribed by the FISC.227 Such misuse of these identifiers,
Judge Walton explained, would amount to a “flagrant violation” of
FISC orders.228 He later stated that the NSA’s explanation for its
noncompliance with FISC courts “strains credulity.”229 Judge Walton
nevertheless allowed the telephony metadata collection program
to continue with reforms,230 which were subsequently lifted.231 
Former FISC Chief Judge John Bates identified significant com-
pliance problems with bulk data collection under section 702 of the
225. See Granick, supra note 222.
226. Interview by Andrea Mitchell, NBC News Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent, with
James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, in Tysons Corner, Va. (June 8, 2013), http://www.
dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/195-speeches-interviews-2013/874-
director-james-r-clapper-interview-with-andrea-mitchell [https://perma.cc/X2U7-2NMU].
Clapper maintained that the NSA merely gathered—as opposed to collected—information
about specific targets, later analogizing collection to “taking the book[ ] off the shelf, opening
it up and reading it.” Id.
227. Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009 at
1-2, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Jan. 28, 2009),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regardi
ng%20Prelim%20Notice%20of%20Compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH68-HBLF].
228. Id. at 4.
229. Order at 5, 11, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13 (FISA
Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20
Order%20from%20FISC.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH6M-A6G5] (complaining that the minimiza-
tion procedures had been “so frequently and systemically violated that it can fairly be said
that this critical element of the overall [section 215 program] has never functioned effec-
tively”).
230. Susan Freiwald, Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide: Competing Visions of the NSA’s
215 Program, 12 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 309, 328-29 (2014). 
231. Specifically, the FISC lifted its requirements that the NSA query the database with
prior FISC approval (or, in an emergency, to query the database on its own but then notify
the FISC by close of the next business day) and that the NSA file a weekly report listing each
time over the preceding seven-day period it had shared any information derived from bulk
metadata collections with anyone outside the NSA. See Donohue, supra note 191, at 819-20.
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FAA.232 The NSA relied on that provision to collect data not only
directly from Internet companies under the PRISM program, but
also from upstream communications (containing both metadata and
content) passing through undersea fiber optic cables and sweeping
up the protected domestic communications of U.S. persons in the
process.233 Judge Bates nevertheless found that the procedures met
the required standard for collection because they were
“reasonably designed” to: 1) “ensure that any acquisition au-
thorized under [the certifications] is limited to targeting persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States”; and
2) “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as
to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the
time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.”234
He reached this conclusion by interpreting the “reasonableness”
standard to accommodate technological limitations: because the
NSA lacked the means to filter out wholly domestic communica-
tions,235 its failure to do so was not unreasonable.236 Judge Bates did
conclude, however, that the minimization standards were not “rea-
sonably designed” to minimize the retention of that information.237
As Orin Kerr has observed, the FISC’s interpretation of surveil-
lance laws suffers from the lack of an effective feedback mechan-
ism.238 Although ordinary criminal warrants are also issued ex parte,
they can provide for ex post review after a warrant is issued. Once
evidence has been seized and criminal charges filed, a defendant can
seek to suppress the evidence.239 This ex post review has produced
an extensive body of jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment
232. See Memorandum Opinion, No. [redacted], at 7 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.
eff.org/files/filenode/fisc_opinion_-_unconstitutional_surveillance_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AU3E-BC7E].
233. Id. at 5.
234. Id. at 41-42 (alteration in original) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1), 188a(d)(1)(2)(B)
(2006)).
235. Id. at 30 (“[D]ue to the technological challenges associated with acquiring Internet
transactions, NSA is unable to exclude certain Internet transactions from its upstream col-
lection.”); see also id. at 44-45.
236. Id. at 48, 58.
237. Id. at 62-63. Instead, those standards maximized the retention of that information.
Id. at 78.
238. Kerr, supra note 209, at 1519-20. 
239. Id.
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exclusionary rule, liquidating constitutional standards—such as
whether a warrant issued on probable cause and, therefore, was rea-
sonable—by means of their application to particular facts.240 The
result has been the creation of a thicket of rules regulating law en-
forcement conduct241 through case-by-case adjudication.242
Surveillance laws, as drafted, seek to balance privacy and secur-
ity.243 But unlike in the case of ordinary criminal warrants, there is
typically no review of the judge’s ex parte decision to grant a FISA
order. One consequence is that surveillance standards, by remaining
indeterminate, tend to augment executive authority, rather than
being distilled into rules that help constrain it. Secrecy exacerbates
this effect by preventing public debate and hindering legal chal-
lenges by preventing those subject to surveillance from establishing
standing to bring suit.244 
Other factors are at work as well, including the desire to preserve
flexibility in the face of rapid technological change.245 New surveil-
lance programs are partly a response to developments that have
made it more difficult to apply a legal framework premised on a
strict division between domestic and international communications.
240. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (explaining that “reason-
ableness” is to be determined by examining the “totality of circumstances” in a particular case
to “assess[ ], on the one hand, the degree to which [government conduct] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests” (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19
(2001))); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (describing reasonableness as “the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment”).
241. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine ... is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be
expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforce-
ment activities in which they are necessarily engaged.” (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-
Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT.
REV. 127, 141)); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 536 (2005) (“[T]he modern Supreme Court has used the text of the Fourth Amendment
to craft a comprehensive set of rules regulating law enforcement.”).
242. See California v. Carey, 471 U.S. 386, 400-01 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The
only true rules governing search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the
painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication.”).
243. Kerr, supra note 209, at 1517.
244. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (dismissing suit chal-
lenging the FAA on the ground that plaintiffs could not establish with sufficient certainty that
they had been the target of surveillance). 
245. See Kerr, supra note 209, at 1522-23 (explaining that “the Internet and technological
surveillance tools are constantly morphing and relentlessly dynamic”).
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Today, for example, many foreign-to-foreign communications, which
would otherwise remain outside FISA,246 now touch a U.S. wire,
thus triggering the requirement of a court order under the FISA
framework. In a world in which it is increasingly difficult to know
which communications to intercept, government officials are prone
to favor standards over rules. Secret law, as it is commonly de-
scribed, thus encompasses more than a lack of transparency in the
underlying legal authority; it also suggests concerns about the
fluidity of a legal standard that gives government officials greater
latitude to act in a changing technological environment at the ex-
pense of more rule-like constraints.
IV. SECRET LAW AS A PROBLEM OF STANDARDS: SOME IMPLICATIONS
Perceptions of legal secrecy derive not only from an absence of
transparency but also from indeterminacy in the law itself due to
the expression of legal directives through standards. Standards are
particularly attractive in the national security context because of
the flexibility they give officials to adapt existing legal authorities
to new and rapidly changing situations. Viewing secret law as a
problem of standards has several implications. Most obviously, it
suggests that the common framing—as a conflict between legal
secrecy and transparency—is too simple. Secrecy exacerbates the
tendency of standards towards expansion and contributes to their
ambiguity. But increased transparency alone will not halt reliance
on national security standards, cabin their inflationary trajectory,
or cure the problem misdiagnosed as secret law. 
Reframing the problem of secret law as one of standards thus
raises the threshold question of whether greater determinacy is
possible in this area. Adrian Vermeule has argued that U.S. admin-
istrative law is essentially Schmittian.247 He divides administrative
law into a series of legal “black holes” and “grey holes.”248 “Black
246. Such foreign-to-foreign communications instead fall under Executive Order No.
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,948 (Dec. 4, 1981).
247. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095,
1103-04 (2009).
248. Id. at 1096; see also DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A
TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006).
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holes,” a term coined by Law Lord Johan Steyn,249 “either explicitly
exempt[ ] the executive from the requirements of the rule of law
or explicitly exclude judicial review of executive action.”250 “Grey
holes,” as described by David Dyzenhaus,251 exist when “there are
some legal constraints on executive action ... but the constraints are
so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it
pleases.”252 Standards operate within the latter space, serving as
what Professor Vermeule describes as “adjustable parameters” to
provide a rule-of-law facade to executive action.253
Professor Vermeule thus finds in standards evidence of the need
to afford the executive sufficient latitude to respond to the exigen-
cies of national security. He explains that “[e]mergencies cannot
realistically be governed by ex ante, highly specified rules, but at
most by vague ex post standards; it is beyond the institutional ca-
pacity of lawmakers to specify and allocate emergency powers in
all future contingencies.”254 Instead, Professor Vermeule argues that
the absence of constraints in the legal regime regulating emer-
gency power, whether or not normatively desirable, is inevitable.255
Standards intended to govern national security powers will remain
adjustable parameters, whether or not they are secret, and the legal
directives they implement will resist liquidation into rules. If such
indeterminacy is inevitable, then trying to give content to the grey
holes of standards is hopeless.
However, others have challenged Professor Vermeule’s assess-
ment of the inevitability of black and grey holes. Evan Criddle has
explained not only how Congress might cabin national security ex-
ceptions in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that provide for
legal black holes,256 but also why federal courts are not “institutionally
249. See Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1,
1 (2004).
250. Vermeule, supra note 247, at 1096 (quoting DYZENHAUS, supra note 248, at 3).
251. DYZENHAUS, supra note 248, at 3.
252. Id. at 42.
253. Vermeule, supra note 247, at 1097.
254. Id. at 1101.
255. Id. at 1133.
256. See Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 309, 311-12 (2010), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1197&context=nulr_online [https://perma.cc/ZXA9-G9SN] (describing
steps Congress could take, including designing malleable procedural requirements to accom-
modate agencies’ legitimate concerns for speed and efficiency without abandoning procedural
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predestined to convert the APA’s flexible standards into grey
holes.”257 Professor Criddle distinguishes between reasoned defer-
ence and de facto abstention, arguing that even after 9/11, federal
courts engaged in the latter not the former.258 While flexible legal
standards may increase the opportunities for judicial abstention, he
maintains that judicial review can still give content to national se-
curity standards.259
Others have focused on the traditional separation of national
security rule making from ordinary domestic rule making.260 The
APA has a “foreign or military affairs function” exception to its usu-
al notice-and-comment requirements,261 which Robert Knowles has
proposed cabining through comprehensive rule-making reform.262
Professor Knowles argues that greater use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking would not only increase public participation but would
also promote a regulatory approach that is more effective and pro-
tective of individual rights,263 at least if coupled with judicial review
restraints during national crises or requiring agencies to develop their own ad hoc admin-
istrative procedures for emergencies); see also David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States
of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2026-28 (2006)
(describing possible legal models to respond to emergencies).
257. Criddle, supra note 256, at 312.
258. Id. (“[L]ower courts in the post-9/11 cases Vermeule identifies undertook a robust
review of agency actions, identifying substantial evidence supporting the agency’s position
and articulating a detailed explanation for upholding the agency’s decision.”).
259. Id. at 313 (“[T]he public need not necessarily resign itself to the inevitability of exe-
cutive and judicial lawlessness during national crises.”).
260. Knowles, supra note 5, at 889-90.
261. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012) (stating that notice-and-comment requirements apply
“except to the extent that there is involved ... a military or foreign affairs function of the
United States”). Professor Knowles describes the exception as “an expression of, if not the
foundation of, the national security administrative state.” Knowles, supra note 5, at 904. The
APA also contains an exception from notice-and-comment requirements for when there is
“good cause” because such requirements would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest.” See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).
262. Knowles, supra note 5, at 933-34 (proposing, for example, issuance of an executive
order requiring additional procedural requirements for rule making by nonindependent fed-
eral agencies).
263. Id. at 938-43 (advocating more frequent use of notice-and-comment rule making, en-
forced by courts through greater scrutiny of an agency’s decision to forego such rule making).
For example, Professor Knowles explains how use of notice-and-comment rule making could
have avoided, or at least minimized, the problems associated with a program implemented
after 9/11—and widely regarded as a failure—that required noncitizens of specifically desig-
nated countries—almost exclusively Muslim nations—to specially register with the Justice
Department. Id. at 892-94.
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that scrutinizes the rationales employed during the agency’s deci-
sion-making process.264 Under a Chenery-based model of judicial
review, for example, a court would uphold an agency rule only on
the grounds specified by the particular agency when the rule was
developed, thus limiting agency power to create policy outside in-
dependent scrutiny.265
The evolution of detention authority under the AUMF suggests
that grey holes are not inevitable. As described above, the Guan-
tanamo habeas litigation provided an important catalyst in the
gradual liquidation of a detention standard under the AUMF.266 To
be sure, that standard retains considerable flexibility and remains
vulnerable to deferential review in individual cases. But judicial
scrutiny did force the executive to articulate legal positions and
prompted decisions on the AUMF’s content. It not only had an
information-forcing effect but also helped define the AUMF’s outer
reach.267 Notably, the law has become more particularized on issues
with which courts have engaged, such as the category of individuals
covered by the AUMF, while remaining more uncertain on ques-
tions courts have tended to avoid, such as the scope and duration of
the armed conflict itself.268 
In short, courts have the potential to mitigate the inflationary
potential of standards. Conversely, barriers to justiciability elimi-
nate an important mechanism for liquidating national security
standards, as has been the case in challenges to targeted killing,
which have thus far been dismissed on justiciability grounds.269 In
264. Id. at 903.
265. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943) (holding that discretionary
administrative action will be upheld only on grounds specified by the agency in the record).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.
267. Rebecca Ingber has observed that an unintended consequence of federal habeas liti-
gation was to force the Obama Administration Justice Department into a reactive posture and
cause it to adopt a more expansive view of presidential detention power than it might other-
wise have taken if it had been relieved of litigation pressures and given greater space to
deliberate. See Ingber, supra note 114, at 375-76. Whether the absence of such pressures
would have led the new administration to adopt a more moderate position is uncertain.
Litigation did, however, provide the primary means by which the AUMF’s broadly worded
directive on the use of military force became more defined. See id.
268. Jonathan Hafetz, Detention Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement
of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal Sentencing, 61 UCLA L. REV. 326, 348-
49, 386-87 (2014) (describing failure of habeas corpus review to address questions surround-
ing the length of AUMF detention).
269. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing suit
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these areas in particular, perceptions about secret law persist.
These perceptions point not only to continuing gaps in transparency
but also to how the relevant legal authority continues to take the
form of a generalized standard that resists liquidation. 
Proposals designed to address barriers to judicial review can
increase the opportunity for standards to gain content through their
application to particular cases. One way would be through reform
of the state secrets privilege,270 which has barred adjudication of
unlawful detention and treatment of detainees.271 Another way
would be legislation that expressly authorizes damages actions, thus
eliminating an obstacle to suits challenging targeted killing and
other contested government conduct.272 The suits might still result
in dismissal, but litigation would provide a means for a fuller and
more refined articulation of the standard at issue.
Surveillance poses particularly difficult challenges because the
need for secrecy—which necessarily excludes notifying the target or
allowing for his participation—is in tension with the central fea-
tures of the adversarial process, which are notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. As the pre-Snowden FISC opinions show, the
absence of this process limited the potential of court review to
impose limits on the growth of standards.273 One reform that could
challenging the President’s authority under the AUMF to engage in the targeted killing of a
U.S. citizen in Yemen for lack of standing and on political question grounds). Efforts to define
the scope of the President’s authority to engage in lethal force have thus drawn by analogy
on decisions in habeas cases interpreting the scope of the President’s detention authority
under the AUMF. See Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 773-74 (2011).
270. See, e.g., State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008) (as introduced in
Senate, Jan. 22, 2008).
271. See John Ames, Note, Secrets and Lies: Reynolds’ Partial Bar to Discovery and the
Future of States Secret Privilege, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1067, 1078-79, 1089 (2014).
272. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Response, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 11, 23-24 (2014), http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
Vladeck_SME2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX7C-37RU] (advocating congressional creation of an
express cause of action providing for judicial review of targeted killings after the fact).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 182-98. While recipients themselves may challenge
orders issued under section 215 or section 702 before the FISC, no recipient has utilized the
adversarial process provided under the statute. See Letter from the Hon. Reggie B. Walton,
Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to the Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 8-9 (July 29, 2013), http://www.leahy.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Honorable%20Patrick%20J%20Leahy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y9P-
SSAZ]. As a result, the mass suspicionless surveillance programs implemented pursuant to
these provisions were approved “almost entirely through ex parte, in camera judicial
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lead to a greater elaboration of legal standards under FISA without
compromising the need for secrecy in surveillance is the appoint-
ment of a special advocate before the FISC.274 Several former FISC
judges275 and scholars276 have supported the appointment of a spe-
cial advocate, which could reduce the risk that the FISC would
uphold expansive interpretations of surveillance authority based on
ex parte submissions. Unlike other ex parte proceedings, FISC
review of applications requires extensive analysis and creates pre-
cedent for future cases.277 But the adjudicatory process tends to
suffer when judges do not hear both sides of an argument or do not
receive the type of in-depth briefing warranted by complex, fact-
based Fourth Amendment issues and the technical details of sur-
veillance programs.278 As the President’s Review Group explained in
proposing the creation of a Public Interest Advocate, “judges are in
a better position to find the right answer on questions of law and
fact when they hear competing views.”279 
In response to these proposals, Congress included a provision in
the USA FREEDOM Act that authorizes the FISC to appoint an
individual to serve as amicus curiae to participate in cases that
present “a novel or significant interpretation of the law.”280 Whether
proceedings.” See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA “Special Advocate”, 2 TEX.
A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2546388 [https://perma.cc/973T-WWGB].
274. See Ensuring Adversarial Process in the FISA Court Act, H.R. 3159, 113th Cong.
§ 2(a)(1) (1st Sess. 2013) (proposing the creation of a standing pool of private “public interest
advocates” appointed by the PCLOB, but not residing within any branch of the government).
275. See James G. Carr, Opinion, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
YNH7-3DPX]; Charlie Savage, Nation Will Gain by Discussing Surveillance, Expert Tells
Privacy Board, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/us/nation-will-
gain-by-discussing-surveillance-expert-tells-privacy-board.html [https://perma.cc/D6UQ-
ETTT] (noting the views of former FISC Judge James Robertson).
276. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 273 (manuscript at 23).
277. Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and Oversight
of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 88 (2013).
278. Id. at 88-89.
279. RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUN-
ICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 203 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-
12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8JK-FB93].
280. Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective
Discipline over Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat.
268, 279.
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this measure, which leaves the appointment in the FISC’s discre-
tion, will succeed in providing more balanced presentations on
important issues remains to be seen. But it offers a potential check
against the inflationary potential of standards. 
Another way to facilitate the liquidation of surveillance standards
would be to provide greater disclosure to criminal defendants where
the government has obtained evidence through FISA, thus creating
an opportunity for a defendant to contest the warrant. While indi-
viduals whose communications are monitored under FISA normally
do not receive notice of the government’s surveillance, the govern-
ment is statutorily required to notify them if it intends to rely on
evidence “obtained or derived” from FISA or the FAA in a criminal
prosecution.281 If, in response to a defendant’s motion for disclosure,
the Attorney General files an affidavit asserting the national se-
curity risks of disclosure, the court must conduct an ex parte, in
camera review to determine if the surveillance was lawful.282 The
statute further contemplates that the court may order disclosure if
in camera and ex parte review will not suffice to determine the
lawfulness of the surveillance.283 This mechanism for disclosure and
adversarial process not only provides a layer of protection to de-
fendants, but also affords a means by which surveillance standards
can be concretized through application to individual cases. But this
mechanism has been underutilized. The government has often failed
to disclose when evidence has been obtained or derived from FISA
or the FAA284 or to disclose the specific authorities it used to obtain
the evidence cited in its FISA applications.285 Courts have also
typically declined to provide an adversarial process, despite their
authority to do so.286 In the one instance in which a court did order
281. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d), 1881(e) (2012).
282. Id. § 1806(f ).
283. See id. (stating that a court may disclose FISA materials to the defendant under ap-
propriate security procedures and protective orders “where such disclosure is necessary to
make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance”).
284. See Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-legal-shift-may-open-door-
for-challenge-to-secret-wiretaps.html [https://perma.cc/7YGK-WNPQ] (describing the govern-
ment’s narrow construction of the “derived from” requirement).
285. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149 (2013) (describing the various
ways the government gains intelligence through surveillance). 
286. See Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance,
Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 865-69, 874-75
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an evidentiary hearing to determine if FISA-derived evidence was
lawfully obtained,287 an appeals court reversed the ruling.288 
While review by courts or agencies is the most common means
for liquidating standards, other mechanisms might be considered.
For example, Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane have pro-
posed adoption of an international Drone Accountability Regime to
address continuing gaps in transparency and accountability sur-
rounding the use of this technology.289 Although the proposed regime
would be based on an informal agreement among states, it would re-
quire public justifications for specific strikes after they occur, which
would be evaluated by an independent Ombudsperson.290 This re-
view process could help concretize norms of use by states through a
nonjudicial process that examines the application of ex ante stan-
dards to specific drone strikes. 
Pressure from civil society can serve as a catalyst for liquidating
national security standards. For example, increased public atten-
tion on drone strikes against suspected terrorists helped force the
Obama administration to articulate limitations on drone use.291
These limitations were outlined initially in a series of speeches and
eventually in the PPG, which provided further nonbinding con-
straints on drone strikes conducted outside “hot” battlefields.292
Yet uncertainty and controversy continue to surround the use of
drone strikes.293 The main obstacle to increased clarity is not a lack
of transparency about the legal standards for targeting, but rather
an absence of information about how those standards are applied
in individual cases. LOAC principles such as necessity, proportional-
ity, and distinction—all of which are incorporated into official U.S.
targeting standards—gain content through their application to
(2014) (describing the failure to provide defendants notice of the use of FISA-derived evidence
and the implications for the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
287. See United States v. Daoud, No. 12 cr 723, 2014 WL 321384, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29,
2014).
288. See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 485 (7th Cir.), supplemented by 761 F.3d
678 (7th Cir. 2014).
289. See generally Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, Toward a Drone Accountability
Regime, 29 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 15 (2015).
290. Id. at 16-17.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 108-32.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
293. See, e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 289, at 18-20 (describing the attractions
and risks of drone use).
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concrete situations.294 Increased precision and certainty in the law
will come with increased knowledge of how those standards are em-
ployed in individual cases. Creating more opportunities for courts
to review the application of standards to specific facts could help
achieve this result.
CONCLUSION
The current legal landscape surrounding the exercise of national
security powers, from the use of military force to bulk data collec-
tion, exhibits a deficient, if sometimes deeply flawed, combination
of rules and standards. The former may be resisted—or violated
outright, as in the case of some surveillance programs—because of
concerns about imposing ex ante restrictions on the executive’s
ability to respond to new threats and adapt to rapid technological
change. Lawmakers ordinarily seek clarity to induce compliance and
avoid socially harmful conduct,295 but much national security law
making—particularly surrounding surveillance—is not primarily
concerned with inducing compliance. Rather, national security law
making is often concerned with gathering information about pos-
sible future noncompliance without notifying potentially noncompli-
ant actors. Standards provide enhanced flexibility but can expand
over time and evade liquidation into more rule-like constraints. The
different forms and distribution of judicial review impede the tail-
oring that ordinarily results from applying standards to the facts of
individual cases.
In some instances, no review occurs because of threshold jus-
ticiability doctrines, such as the state secrets privilege or political
question doctrine. In other instances, review is ex parte and not
subject to correction. And in other instances, the political economy
of litigation—which favors risk-adverse decision making and judicial
deference to the executive—limits oversight and stunts clarification
of the law. Meanwhile, institutional incentives and political pres-
sures encourage the executive to pursue a legal framework that
maximizes its flexibility to respond to emerging security threats. 
294. See Koh, supra note 96.
295. Diver, supra note 28, at 73.
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The problem of inflationary standards is often misidentified as
secret law. To be sure, secrecy remains an important issue, as it can
obscure the indeterminacy in the underlying legal authority on
which executive officials are relying, shield critical facts from public
view, and justify barriers to litigation for fear of disclosing sensitive
security information. Yet the conception of secret law as a fixed body
of legal authority hidden from the public that needs only to be un-
covered fails to capture how the law itself continues to take the form
of generalized and elastic standards. Increased precision in the law
requires not only more transparency, which facilitates public discus-
sion and debate, but also more opportunities for national security
standards to be liquidated through their application to particular
cases. 

